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This symposium on Catholic social thought and its place in our
environmental politics could not be better timed. Even as we enter the 2008
presidential election, Americans lack a productive vocabulary for climate
disruption! and our part in either its cause or cure. Our consumption of
fossil fuels, though steadied for now by a sinking economy, has remained
essentially unchanged by the Clean Air Act or any other federal law aimed
at "pollution" broadly defined? Indeed, our "addiction" to "foreign oil" and

* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. My thanks go to the
editors of the University of St. Thomas Law Journal for their excellent editorial support and to
Irene Burkhard and Wendy Cline for much needed research assistance.
1. I thank Professor Linda Malone for the moniker.
2. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has never regulated the emission of
greenhouse gases as pollution under the Clean Air Act, although the Supreme Court's opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007), concluding that the Act's definition of "air
pollutant" includes greenhouse gases, probably put a near-term limit on that particular failure.
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other fossil fuels is so obvious that even this President bemoans it. 3 The
little public deliberation that has occurred on global warming has been
bereft of imperatives or, in fact, of much talk about obligation at alL4 In this
article I argue that our paralysis is due not only to the complexity of this
problem, but also to our inability to imagine actions against it that are both
practicable and meaningfuL Our notions of moral imperatives are
reductionistic by nature and that makes them unfit for so complex a public
problem. In my view, Catholic social thought's principles of solidarity and
subsidiarity could fill important roles in this breach, given their proven
traction and adaptability. In a fundamental way, of course, Catholic
teachings are better fit for the private than for the public sphere. But
progress against this social problem may come only in the form of
piecemeal (mostly private) actions for many years to come. In short, these
principles could be of truly central importance no matter where they
operate.
This article makes the case for solidarity and subsidiarity as principles
of applied ethics by injecting them into what must be their most challenging
context-and ours-: catastrophic global climate disruption. Part I
describes what we know about this problem while Part IT frames the
principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. Part III lays out a context in which
global climate disruption and subsidiarity intersect: designing the built
environment in the United States and the so-called "green building." Part
IV situates this context within our land use planning traditions and the
coming battle for building standards in our changing climate. Finally, Part
V compares building green asa moral and as a legal obligation in our world
of unknown possibilities and consequences.

r.

A CHANGING CLIMATE: POLITICS IN THE AGE OF ECOLOGY

Americans of all kinds ache for a richer political discourse. Focus
groups and professional messaging seem to have stolen from political campaigns what they used to produce: actual deliberation in public discourse.
Fuel economy in the United States will likely remain a national shame, though. In 2002, the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that the "corporate average fuel economy" standards
maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration pursuant to a series of
legislative mandates had improved the nation's fuel economy by at most fourteen percent. See
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BOARD ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS,
EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT OF CORPORATE AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY (CAFE) STANDARDS
13-30, 111 (2002).
3. See PETER TERTZAKIAN, A THOUSAND BARRELS A SECOND: THE COMING OIL BREAK
POINT AND THE CHALLENGES FACING AN ENERGY DEPENDENT WORLD ix (2007) (,"America is
addicted to oil,' President George W. Bush declared in his January 2006 State of the Union
address.").
4. Former Vice President Al Gore's book and movie are the exceptions here in that they did
speak to global warming as a public imperative of the highest order and still entered popular
consciousness and media of many forms.
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Public political dialogue in this country has long been unproductive, creating little more than derision or polarization on most issues. 5
Democracy can be healthy with no serious political argument if
there is nevertheless a broad consensus about what is to be done.
It can be healthy even if there is no consensus if it does have a
culture of argument. But it cannot remain healthy with deep and
bitter divisions and no real argument, because it then becomes
only a tyranny of numbers. 6
Recent experience with the electoral arithmetic of red and blue states is
probably best understood as its own form of tyranny: the "consultants'
republic."7
Climate disruption has been emblematic of this national decline. 8 Nevertheless, something remarkable is happening lately. Global warming is no
longer being excluded from the public sphere. It is instead gaining an urgency in America that seemed impossible just a few years ago. States and
municipalities have begun tackling greenhouse gas emissions in an array of
sub-national initiatives. 9 Furthermore, American citizens, CEOs, and
elected officials are dwelling on climate disruption like never before and
doing so in the midst of an intractable war, a sagging economy, diminishing
American power abroad, and a host of other top-shelf issues that one would
easily imagine swamping it in the public consciousness. So what is
happening?
We are confident the earth is warming and we are reasonably confident
that humanity has played a significant causal role.lO We are acquiring what
seems to be an ability to predict some regional and local outcomes of climate disruptionY But as to the balance of catastrophe and correction and
whether we have sufficient time and technology to avert the most cata5. Acrimony is one thing. Being wholly unproductive is another thing entirely and political
discourse in the United States seems lately to have migrated to the latter, especially in our environmental politics. See generally TED NORDHAUS & MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER, BREAK THROUGH:
FROM THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY (2007).
6. RONALD DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIELE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL
DEBATE 6 (2006); see generally JAMES BOHMAN, PUBLIC DELIEERATION: PLURALISM, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRACY (2000).
7. See Douglas Kysar, The Consultants' Republic, 121 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008)
(reviewing NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 5).
8. In the infamous petition denial remanded in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438
(2007), the EPA even argued that Congress's lack oflegislative action on climate change and the
control of greenhouse gases was the definitive word on the issue as a threat to public health. See
Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52, 922, 52,
925-29 (Sept. 8, 2003).
9. See, e.g., Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1877 (2006).
10. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1-5 (2007) [hereinafter !PCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wgl.htm.
11. See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE AND BIODfVERSITY (Thomas E. Lovejoy & Lee Hannah eds.,
2005).
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strophic manifestations of climate disruption, we remain utterly baffled.
Even after years of mandated data collection,12 and perhaps the single
greatest coordinated scientific effort in human history, 13 we simply do not
know with any meaningful degree of certainty what the pace and ultimate
directions of climate disruption will be. This is not that surprising by itself.
"[I]nformation about the environmental consequences of our actions is not
free, abundant, and unerringly accurate, but is more typically scarce, costly
to assemble, highly uncertain, and variable in quality."14 The scale of this
problem is what distinguishes it. Even with legions of the world's scientists
working on it and the entire planet's health hanging in the balance, we remain deeply uncertain about both means and ends where global warming is
concerned. Do the leaders of a developing country have an obligation to
limit their contributions of heat-trapping gases to the atmosphere or is their
obligation to their citizens to grow their economy as fast and as broadly as
possible so that they may protect themselves against the harshest effects of
climate disruption? This is factual and moral uncertainty combined and it
has made public political debate about climate disruption inherently unstable, prone to sidetracking, and, thus far at least, highly polarizing and
unproductive. 15
At least for the United States, the problem with unilateral emissions
cuts is that about four-fifths of the projected growth in global CO2 emissions over the coming two decades will be from developing nations like
China and India. 16 Both economies are projected to sustain double-digit
growth for most of that time and both are expected to rely heavily on fossil
fuels to do soY The estimates are that China may have already surpassed
the U.S. in emissions and that by 2009 it will have certainly done SO.18
Various kinds of "leakage" from one economy to another are possible, perhaps even likely, where only one economy is controlling emissions. 19 In12. IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 10, at 118-19.
13. See id. at 95.
14. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's Environmental Peiformance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 926 (2002).
15. See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Bush Steps Out Front on Climate Issue,
WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2007, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentiarticle/2007/09/22/AR2007092201095_2.html ("The White House will oppose anything that
would 'make Granny pay 20 percent more for electricity' if that money were to 'go to pay for
more efficiency in China . . . .' "). Professor Bohman has called situations like this one
"hypercomplexity": a "degree of complexity which makes rational public decision making impossible." BOHMAN, supra note 6, at 158.
16. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2006
71-79 (2006).
17. See, e.g., Carolien Kroeze et aI., The Power Sector in China and India: Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Reduction Potential and Scenarios for 1990-2020, 32 ENERGY POL'y 55, 56 (2004)
("The energy systems in China and India are largely coal-based, so that it can be expected that
emissions will increase relatively fast during the corning decades.").
18. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1961, 1967 n.22 (2007).
19. "Leakage" is an umbrella term for individuals' strategic reactions seeking to exploit incomplete regulatory controls and/or incentives. It can be geographic, temporal, or behavioral.
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deed, not only does the threat of leakage undermine the rationality of
unilateral emissions cuts; it problematizes virtually everything but comprehensive, trans-systemic emissions cuts where no economy, or at least no
substantial economy, is uncontrolled. 20 This is in part why the Kyoto Protocol cratered before it even got going,zl "Leakage," it turns out, is a neutralsounding term for a brutal truth about modern globalization: if economic
competition is the cause of your problem today, unless more economic
competition (or military force) is its solution, the solution may well be out
of reach.
The problem with multilateral emissions cuts are the "settlement
costs" that inhere in negotiating anything so complex,z2 "[T]he most important part of an effective regime to limit climate change involves not an
agreement among governments but the effective influence of governments
on their publics."23 Thus, even if nations could lay aside their differences
and competitive natures, it would remain unclear that the major nation
states have the means necessary to control the Earth's six (almost seven)
billion people. Many people behave strategically and to their own immediate advantage, however, they find their opportunities. That reality swells the
information-and other costs surrounding the negotiation of any multilateral carbon system. Indeed, it swells those costs to gargantuan, virtually
prohibitive proportions,z4 The risks and consequences of error when decisions of this kind are scaled up become enormous and concentrated. Inaction, not surprisingly, is the norm at such scales.
Today, fossil fuels have so many applications-they have been so
widely employed for so long-that quickly removing them from the global
economy is just not feasible. Nor would it necessarily be the right thing to
do. Starvation, death from exposure, and other ailments, would all certainly
rise. Beyond issues of feasibility and health concerns, fossil fuel technology
is fundamental to industrial and residential design today, a staple of the way
[Rjestricting forest clearing in Country A would restrict timber supply and raise the
world market price for timber, inducing an increase in the quantity of timber harvested
in Country B. Prices also affect trade in emissions-intensive products: as Country A
restricts its emissions, the price of emissions-intensive goods produced within Country
A will rise and the quantity will decrease. Unregulated producers in Country B will
respond by increasing their production of these emissions-intensive goods, both for domestic consumption and for export to Country A.
Id. at 1968.
20. Stefan Felder & Thomas F. Rutherford, Unilateral CO2 Reductions and Carbon Leakage:
The Consequences of International Trade in Oil and Basic Materials, 25 1. ENVTL. EeON. &
MGMT. 162, 175-76 (1993).
21. See Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, 77 FOREIGN AFFs. 66,
66-67 (1998).
22. See id. at 68-74.
23. Id. at 70.
24. The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change is indicative in this regard. In substance, even at a juncture where much of today's scientific "consensus" on climate change was
already in place (1991-92), the parties simply could not agree how or to what degree to reduce
their GHG emissions. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE 1. lNT'L L. 451, 481-92 (1993).
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our civilizations imagine their own improvements,zs Yet, as we now know,
this technology is unparalleled as a means of externalizing costs. In short,
its "subglobal regulation can omit important sources today and induce leakage to unregulated areas tomorrow."26
Like much economic reasoning, though, the literature on leakage to
evade legal controls is more prophecy than proven fact. Indeed, under scrutiny, this kind of reasoning turns out to be quite brittle. 27 When good data
are assembled, the "leakage" from jurisdictions controlling externalities
usually turns out to be much lower and much less predictable than the economists and econometricians like to admit. 28 Firms and people relocate for
many reasons-only some of which are rational. Relocation decisions are
often based on imperfect information, personal habits and heuristics, and
plain-old sentimentality and love of place. Most transboundary commercial
flows turn out to be much less linear and predictable than economics suggests. In short, to forecast the doom of initiatives that are compromised by
jurisdictional mismatch is not only to ignore the virtues of second-best strategies. It is to showcase one's ignorance of the history of actual environmental controls in modern capitalism,z9 To say that small-scale actions can
work is not to say that they necessarily do work or that they are immune to
the legal pressures that afflict full-scale actions. 3D Part II considers the complexity of subsidiarity today.

II.

RECOGNIZING THE PRINCIPLES OF SOLIDARITY
AND SUBSIDIARITY TODAY

In a 1931 encyclical, Quadragesimo anno, Pope Pius XI expressed a
teaching that the Catholic Church has regarded as fundamental ever since:
"it is an injustice ... to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity func25. That is not to say that the described outcome was natural or necessary. Fossil fuel technology, principally the combustion-driven production of energy, had its schemers, promoters, and
monopolists. See, e.g., EDWIN BLACK, INTERNAL COMBUSTION: How CORPORATIONS AND GovERNMENTS ADDICTED THE WORLD TO OIL AND DERAILED THE ALTERNATIVES (2006).
26. Wiener, supra note 18, at 1972.
27. A critical analysis of this reasoning based on several case studies is DAVID VOGEL, TRADING Up: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995). Of
course, the limitations of case studies on such questions are vividly illustrated by opposite findings
using different case studies. See, e.g., CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT (2006).
28. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:
A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); see also Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1321 (1997).
29. Cf. Wiener, supra note 18, at 1973 (observing that "state level strategies could yield
some payoffs" on GHGs "including (i) stimulating technological innovation that could diffuse to
other unregulated places, (ii) learning by experimentation with alternative policy designs, and (iii)
raising the specter of a patchwork of inconsistent state regulations as a political gambit to motivate
industry" to support broader regulation).
30. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37
ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10653 (2007) (analyzing the constitutional challenges that could arise against
California's greenhouse gas emissions controls).
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tions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate
bodies.'>31 This became known as the principle of subsidiarity, although its
familiarity to Americans (however slight) probably has more to do with the
European Union's use of it than with Catholicism's.32 John Paul II recast
the principle in epistemic terms and linked it directly to another principle of
political and spiritual agency, the principle of solidarity. He maintained
they were two sides of the same coin. Where solidarity represented a "commitment to the good of one's neighbor," subsidiarity represented a corresponding "conviction that 'needs are best understood and satisfied by
people who are closest to them. ",33 Subsidiarity demands that the central
state defer to its subordinate ranks of government and civil society wherever possible just as solidarity demands that no one's needs be ignored.
Many Catholics now view these two principles as their "rejoinder" to "the
triumphant norms of consumerism [that] are ascending to the status of nonnegotiable, absolute values" in America and elsewhere. 34 In my view, they
sketch a compelling, if complicated, moral vision of personality and political organization.
One should certainly commit to the common good as best she can and
it might well be a grave injustice to elevate collective action to broader
scales than are necessary. But for anyone whose beliefs are not driven by
Catholic faith, or at least by faith alone (and I confess mine are not), the
principles of solidarity and subsidiarity are on a very different footing. In
fact, their truth is probably no easier to establish in our global economy
than, for example, the actual extent of "leakage" of economic activity
across national borders. While Catholics ought to subscribe to these principles as Church doctrine, their weight in the secular world must be measured
by reason alone. Not surprisingly, those measurements turn out to be very
complicated.
Perhaps the best place to start is with their existence in fact. Have they
played any role in our politics or history and, if so, what role? In recent
history, subsidiarity arose within the European Union much as federalism
did in the United States: out of the realpolitik of negotiating and establishing concurrent jurisdictions to prescribe. 35 That is hardly evidence of its
justice. So what do these principles amount to in secular reason? The Green
31. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35
IND. L. REv. 103, 109 (2001) (quoting Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo anno (1931), reprinted in
SEVEN GREAT ENCYCLICALS 147, para. 79 (1963)).
32. See Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616, 619-20 (1994).
33. Robert K. Vischer, Solidarity, Subsidiarity, and the Consumerist Impetus of American
Law, in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LAW 85,
85-86 (Michael M. ScaperJanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007) (quoting Pope John Paul II,
Sollicitudo rei socialis, para. 38 (1987) and Centesimus Annus, para. 48 (1991)).
34. Id. at 86.
35. See, e.g., LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE EuROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2001). "Solidarity," the Polish Trade Union founded
at the Lenin Shipyard in 1980, a union that agitated quite effectively within the communist bloc,
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parties of Europe, when they are not arguing that subsidiarity is natural and
therefore right, often argue that concentrating power has usually generated
ecologically harmful practices. 36 Subsidiarity is better by this argument because modern societies' departures from it have ended badly.37 On this
footing, it is a principle of practical political action-a principle of agency,
so to speak. The principle is open to empirical doubts, and perhaps other
doubts as well.
Increasing centralization has normally been a function of scale in
human history and the growth of human industry has usually coincided with
environmental disruptions of many kinds. Is it growth or governance that is
the cause, though? As Mark Sagoff perceptively aligned the matter two decades ago, our liberalism's instinctual trust in individuals to know their own
needs applies to governmental process as well as it does chosen ends. And
our citizenry has chosen increasing centralization for generations, especially
on environmental issues. 38 No doubt people would lead more fulfilled and
meaningful lives if they spent less time acquiring stuff and more time investing their labor and capital in a community.39 What no one has proved
yet is that our "sustainability" (whatever that means 40) depends on it. 41 The
fact that we have become so environmentally destructive at the same juncture our culture and society have tilted so heavily toward the centralized
support of consumer markets hardly proves that a liberal constitutional
structure is the cause, or even a principal cause, of the destruction. In fact,
for all we know it may be a still more authoritarian, centralized state that
balances our society in the future.
So what role ought the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity play in
our political-constitutional lives today? It should be said that without a relatively thick theory of justice in which to situate them, it is hard to prove that
the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity are preferable to, or adequate
substitutes for, pragmatism in its widest sense. 42 Catholicism provides that
was apparently related to John Paul II's teachings of solidarity as commitment to the common
good. See GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN PAUL II 323-24 (1999).
36. See ROBERT E. GOODIN, GREEN POLITICAL THEORY 115-31 (1992).
37. See ANDREW DOBSON, GREEN POLITICAL THOUGHT 120-21 (3d ed. 2000).
38. See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 146-70 (1988).
39. Progressives of very different stripes make this case today. See, e.g., BILL McKIBBEN,
DEEP ECONOMY: THE WEALTH OF COMMUNITIES AND THE DURABLE FUTURE (2007); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996).
40. See BRYAN G. NORTON, SUSTAINABILITY: A PHILOSOPHY OF ADAPTIVE ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (200S).
41. This may be because too many variables depend upon each other. See GOODIN, supra
note 36, at 11S-23; DOBSON, supra note 37, at 117 ("[T]he dynamics of political accountability
cannot easily be made to work in the environmental context: 'how can politicians be brought to
book for decisions whose consequences will only be fully felt long after the individuals concerned
have retired from the political stage?' ").
42. There is good reason to believe Dewey's pragmatism (if not that of the Progressive Era
as a whole) was of a piece with solidarity and subsidiarity. See JENNIFER WELCHMAN, DEWEY'S
ETHICAL THOUGHT (199S); see infra notes 17S-77 and accompanying text.
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theory for Catholics. But the prevailing liberal theories of justice elevate
individual preferences above all until conflicts among individuals arise. 43
Supposedly, liberal theories of justice therefore justify much of our current
structure-unless and until our people change their minds. In so much, liberalism is often linked to the "consumerism" of American society today.44
Liberalism is, on this thinking, rather incongruent with the principles of
solidarity and subsidiarity. In my view, though, given the mutability of
preferences both individual and collective, this incongruence is importantly
different from incompatibility. An example will illustrate the incongruence.
Some environmental policy in our country has adhered to the principle
of subsidiarity, if not solidarity: land use policy is still mostly a matter of
local control. Indeed, land use controls would be a good metric in any effort
to measure the justice of the subsidiarity principle. As many have long argued, the record there is mixed at best,45 especially if the protection of
nature is the focus. 46 On the other hand, local control over land use has
remained the norm even in the face of powerful centralizing influences.
Here, too, myth and misstatement have usually crowded empirical facts out
of the public debate about land use, "sprawl," and other social costs and
savings from our localism. 47 How much of our built environment is what it
is because of local~as opposed to state or federal-governance? How
much of it is the result of our consumerism? In some sense, these, too, are
empirical questions. Practically, though, they turn on extremely controversial judgments rooted in an ever-expanding universe of data. 48 In fact,
whether one thinks the energy-intensive, culturally banal forms of suburbia
and exurbia are the vindication of the subsidiarity principle or its defeat
probably has more to do with one's preferences and beliefs than it does
empirical knowledge. Still, even suburbia's defenders ultimately cast individual choice as both the cause and consequence of our built environments.
If I shop at a suburban Wal-Mart rather than a downtown department store or choose to live in an apartment near the old downtown rather than in a single-family house on five acres in exurbia,
these choices have an effect on urban form. If my choices are
echoed by those of many other people, they can have a profound
effect. More than any other human artifact in the world today, our
urban areas are the result of the actions of every citizen, every
group, and every institution, every day.49
43. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
44. See, e.g., Vischer, supra note 33, at 87-93.
45. See generally DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (3d ed. 2003).
46. See Jamison E. Colburn, Localism's Ecology: Protecting and Restoring Habitat in the
Suburban Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 945 (2006).
47. See generally Michael Lewyn, Five Myths About Sprawl, 23 HARV. BLACKLETTBR L.J.
81 (2007) (reviewing ROBERT BRUBGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY (2005)).
48. See BRUEGMANN, supra note 47, at 96-112; Colburn, supra note 46, at 962-67.
49. BRUBGMANN, supra note 47, at 225.
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So what is to be done? What practical actions are we to take? Many
argue that 'voting green and living brown' is hypocritical. After all, what is
green living? Is it driving a Prius and recycling your waste?50 Others argue
that "[c]ollective action can make a real difference to the state of the world,
in a way that individual action cannot."51 This dispute is where the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity are most needed today. The difference
between one's agency as a consumer and one's agency as a citizen is almost
certainly no real difference at all. Americans constantly confront choices
with ramifications for each. But should they even try to prioritize between
the two? In the balance of this article, I use a land use example to explore
this pseudo-boundary and the prioritizations people must confront in the
shadow of catastrophic climate disruption. The example I use is so-called
"green building."
III.

THE GROWTH OF GREEN BUILDING IN THE UNITED STATES,

1998-2008
"Green building" barely registered in the United States a decade ago.
Today, it accounts for more than ten percent of all new commercial construction52 and the figure is still growing. If a subsidiarity theorist were to
look at the growth of green building here, she would identify one particular
"mediating structure,,53 leading this growth and empowering consumers to
make informed choices: the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC). Last
year, the USGBC rolled out its standards for the construction of residential
housing: "Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design" (LEED) for
Homes. 54 The LEED for Homes rollout has been a sensation in itself and is
now the subject of a massive power struggle. Part III describes the furious-some would say viral-growth of the USGBC standards for green
construction since 1998 and the present state of this art. Part III describes
the political struggle now emerging between USGBC and another giant in
50. Another contributor to this Symposium, Professor Andrew Morriss, tells a tale of the
awful mining pit behind the Toyota Prius's battery meant to prove Priuses are actually more
environmentally harmful than, for example, GM's Hummer. See Symposium, Peace with Creation: Catholic Perspectives on Environmental Law, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1 (2007) (comment
inspired by Prof. Morriss's presentation during panel discussion on Sept. 21, 2007). Even assuming it is true (and there are good reasons to doubt that tale), I am dubious of its relevance to any
real question-except perhaps as further proof that the larger businesses grow, the more opaque
they become to their customers and the less able consumers are to make informed judgments.
51. GOODIN, supra note 36, at 121.
52. See BUILDING DESIGN+CONSTRUCTION, GREEN BUILDINGS AND THE BOTTOM LINE (2006)
[hereinafter BD+C].
53. "[M]ediating structures" are "'those institutions standing between the individual in his
private life and the large institutions of public life.''' Vi scher, supra note 31, at 116 (quoting
Richard John Neuhaus & Peter Berger, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating Structures in
Public Policy, in THE ESSENTIAL NEOCONSERVATIVE READER 213,214 (Mark Gerson ed., 1996).
54. U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, LEED FOR HOMES PROGRAM PILOT RATING SYSTEM
(Version 1.11a 2007) [hereinafter LEED-H], available at http://www.usgbc.org/ShowFile.aspx?
DocumentID=2267.
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the construction industry, the National Association of Home Builders
(NAHB).
The nonprofit USGBC was formed in 1993 with some financial help
from the U.S. Department of Energy.55 Today it bills itself as "composed of
more than 12,000 organizations from across the building industry that are
working to advance structures that are environmentally responsible, profitable, and healthy places to live and work.,,56 USGBC bills its LEED standards as "voluntary, market-driven building rating system based on existing
proven technology that derives market strength and credibility through industry-wide development of the LEED products."57 Since its founding and
its 1998 release of its first standard, LEED for New Construction
(LEED-NC),58 the USGBC has become a giant of measuring, benchmarking, and branding environmental performance in the construction sector.
"With significant and favorable recent coverage in the New York Times,
Vanity Fair, and the trade publications of builders and design professionals ... green building has acquired an undeniable cachet among groups not
always aligned."59 Presently, the tidal wave of interest in green building is
making the USGBC into a potent force. 6o Indeed, it is no exaggeration to
say that USGBC is at least beginning to govern through markets. 61
At the core of the LEED system, counterbalancing its flexibility, is the
requirement that a third party assess the building as built and rate it independent of the builder. 62 Third party certification adds a layer of cost to
LEED beyond any higher costs from the building's higher caliber construction. 63 USGBC estimates that a certification under its LEED for Homes, for
example, will cost between $500 and $2000 per unit depending on a num55. See Barnaby J. Feder, Environmentally Conscious Developers Try to Turn Green into
Platinum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004.
56. U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, ABOUT USGBC, http://www.usgbc.orglDisplayPage.
aspx?CMSPageID=124 (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
57. LEED-H, supra note 54, at 4.
58. The first iteration of LEED-NC was piloted in 1998 but immediately reformulated based
on feedback from the public and re-released two years later. The 2000 "Version 2.0" of
LEED-NC became a force in green building thereafter almost overnight.
59. Brian D. Anderson, Legal and Business Issues of Green Building, WIS. LAW., Aug. 2006,
at 10.
60. Id. at 12 ("Although other rating systems exist, the USGBC has virtually cornered the
market on the rating of green commercial buildings.").
61. See BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION
AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY (2004) (comparing several factors in measuring
the strength of Forest Stewardship Council certification of forest products in different markets).
62. USGBC issues "credit interpretations" as necessary. See LEED-H, supra note 54, at 21.
63. The principles of accounting for and sorting out the costs of buildings over their useful
lives are in flux today. Some argue that proper cost accounting yields net savings when standards
like LEEDs are met. See Ed Bartlett & Nigel Howard, Informing the Decision Makers on the Cost
and Value of Green Building, 28 BUILDING REs. & INFO. 315 (2000) (showing different methods
of cost accounting for different interested parties that yield net savings from energy efficient
construction investments). Others argue that cost savings from efficiencies alone will probably
not recoup the added costs of construction for a long time to come. See generally Niklaus Kohler
& Thomas Liitzkendorf, Integrated Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 BUILDING REs. & INFO. 338 (2002).
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ber of variables. 64 Most everything else is within the builder's power to
balance as its own resources and site(s) permit. 65 This combination of firm!
site flexibility,66 third party certification,67 and nationwide branding68 has
catapulted the LEED standards to today's forefront of green consumptionor at least green consumerism. What they do next turns in good part on how
the law responds to their terrific growth.
Each LEED standard measures overall building performance across a
suite of environmental and energy concerns and is meant to provide a nationally uniform benchmark as such. 69 The suite consists of siting, water
conservation, energy and material conservation, indoor air quality, and a
catchall category for innovative design. 70 Each part of the suite has
mandatory elements and then a wider set of optional goals that acquire
points. The better the building's performance on water conservation, for
example, the more points it collects toward its overall score. Scores are
composited from all the categories to earn the building's LEED "rating."
Ratings range from a low of certified to silver, gold, and a high of platinum71 -although only a tiny fraction of building today is at the gold level
or higher. Now it must be said that the "concept of controlling and measuring the impact of the construction of modern buildings on the environment
is [still] quite new and revolutionary, especially at the level of detail" undertaken by the LEED standards. 72 Indeed, the biggest challenge right now
is the continued development of "life cycle analysis" itself-the complex
analytical work of assessing the total costs and benefits of a designlbuild/
operate enterprise. 73 Design choices too often have unintended and unfore64. See U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, LEED FOR HOMES FAQ 4, http://www.usgbc.org/
Show File.aspx?DocumentID=3356 (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
65. Intra-firm flexibility has been cited as a key to LEED's success in the construction industry. See Jesse Ratcliffe, Reenvisioning the Risk Bubble: Utilizing a System of Intra-Firm Risk
Trading for Environmental Protection, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1779, 1818 (2004).
66. See id.
67. On the value of third party certification, see Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law
and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 147 (1993).
68. On the importance of a brand in environmental certifications, see Misty L. Archambault,
Making the Brand: Using Brand Management to Encourage Market Acceptance of Forestry Certification, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1400 (2006).
69. See, e~g., LEED-H, supra note 54, at 5 ("While there are already a number of local or
regional green home building programs, LEED for Homes is attempting to provide national consistency in defining the features of a green home and to enable builders anywhere in the country to
obtain a green rating on their homes.").
70. See id.; Stephen T. Del Percio, The Skyscraper, Green Design & the LEED Green Building Rating System: The Creation of Uniform Sustainable Standards for the 21st Century of the
Pelpetuatioll of all Architectural Fiction?, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'y J. 117, 121-22
(2004).
71. Del Percio, supra note 70, at 121 n.17.
72. INT'L CODE COUNCIL, ICC GREEN BUILDING WHITE PAPER 2 (2007) [hereinafter ICC
WHITE PAPER], http://www .iccsafe.org!news!greenIICC_Green_Building_White_ Paper. pdf.
73. Se(! Kohler & Liitzkendorf, supra note 63, at 338; see also ICC WHITE PAPER, supra note
72, at 2-3 ("The determination of what are the proper applications of new concepts such as life
cycle analysis ... and embodied energy ... are still in their early stages of development.").
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seen consequences. At the very least, this kind of life cycle analysis entails
high, and sometimes extreme, information costs. At worst, it is pointless
because necessary information is too costly to acquire.
Focusing on the construction sector was common sense. While only
constituting eight percent of gross domestic product (GDP), it accounts for
roughly forty percent of the raw materials we take from the earth annually74
and more than a third of what we landfilU5 If the operational lives of our
buildings are counted, they come to over sixty percent of all the electricity
we use76 and, by some estimates, forty percent of our total GHG emissions. 77 When and if the tradeoffs buried in our design decisions are factored into official estimates of "economic growth,"78 though, Americans'
views of GDP might shift dramatically. Focusing on the residential construction sector in particular sharpens the point. It alone amounts to an estimated twenty-two percent of the total energy consumed in the U.S. and
seventy-four percent of its municipal water consumption. 79 Residential development and its attendant infrastructure, indeed, are now the major challenges for biodiversity, water quality, and soil protection advocates. 8o As
more homes are built on more land with higher opportunity costs in the
form of the disturbances they bring, the systemic costs generated by our
land use pOlicies are becoming clearer. Like so many missed opportunities
in our politics, though, people are left to perceive these risks as individuals,
without the aid of collective deliberation. 81
74. Charles J. Kibert, Policy Instruments for a Sustainable Built Environment, 17 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 379, 384 (2002).
75. Del Percio, supra note 70, at 125-26.
76. U.S. GREEN BUILDlNG COUNCIL, NEW CONSTRUCTION VERSION 2.2 REFERENCE GUIDE 12
(2d ed. 2006).
77. The International Energy Agency studied aECD countries in 2005 and estimated that
buildings accounted for thirty to forty percent of national energy use and gave a central estimate
of thirty percent of total GHG emissions in those countries. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY,
CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION 1971-2005 II-92-100 (2007).
78. See RICHARD T.T. FORMAN ET AL., ROAD ECOLOGY: SCIENCE AND SOLUTIONS 55-62
(2003).
79. LEED-H, supra note 54, at 4. Haphazard residential development is already contributing
to serious water shortages in many parts of the country. See ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES:
GROUNDWATER PUMPlNG AND THE FATE OF AMERICA's FRESH WATERS 195-224 (2002). But energy use is more likely to be a true backstop. A study released by New York City last year
observed that city residents produce seventy percent less greenhouse gases per capita simply because "less energy is needed to heat, cool, light, and fuel buildings in the city because they are
more densely packed and because residences are smaller than the national average." John R.
Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 36 REAL EST. LJ. 211, 212 (2007)
(citing Inventory of New York City Greenhouse Gas Emissions, April 10, 2007, available at http:/
/www.nyc.govlhtrnl/orn!pdf/ccp_report041007.pdf).
80. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WHY CONSERVATION Is FAILlNG AND How IT CAN REGAlN
GROUND (2006).
81. Perceptions of such risks are as skewed as they are central to a functioning democracy.
See generally Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675 (1993);
Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCI. 280 (1987).
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So does building green cost more or is it really just a catalyst for rethinking design and design teams?82 A homeowner may wonder whether
the premium she pays to build a LEED-H home is giving her a higher
caliber home or just a sense of moral superiority. A good part of that turns
on what the future holds for water and energy. A home that is designed to
use less is likely to be more comfortable, secure, and valuable in a future of
scarcity than one that is not. But a future of uneven scarcity, where national
and/or state policies subsidize water and energy availability within the borders of particular jurisdictions-thereby externalizing the scarcity-erases
the differences between our two homes as homes. And, indeed, like the
national leader unsure whether to trust others to reduce their GHG emissions or rather to grow their national wealth in preparation for catastrophic
climate disruption, people are in a quandary when it comes to practical action against GHGs. They are left to doubt whether cooperating with some is
always univocal (because it is beneficient) or rather if cooperation can be
both an end in itself and also a means to the end of a fully-scaled collective
action. This seems to be a kind of Green's dilemma. 83
EPA estimates that the average American family spends about $1300
annually on home energy (NAHB estimates about $1600).84 Individual consumers are somewhat like nation states as market actors: when prices rise,
their behaviors shift. 85 With energy costs rising, people are demanding energy efficiency in their buildings-including their homes-so this market is
growing. A recent study by NAHB estimated that the residential green
building marketplace will grow from $7.4 billion in 2005 to between $19
82. Two studies carried out on LEED standards independent of USGBC by Davis Langdon, a
property and construction firm, found that "there is no significant difference in average costs for
green buildings as compared to non-green buildings" but that "[u]ntil design teams understand that
green design is not additive, it will be difficult to overcome the notion that green costs more,
especially in an era of rapid cost escalation." DAVIS LANGDON, COST OF GREEN REVISITED: REEXAMINING THE FEASIBILITY AND COST IMPACT OF SUSTAINABLE DESIGN IN THE LIGHT OF INCREASED
MARKET ADOPTION 3 (2007) [hereinafter COST OF GREEN REVISITED].
83. Professor Goodin portrays such dilemmas as a Prisoner's Dilemma, GOODIN, supra note
36, at 167-68, but it is unclear that the Prisoner's Dilemma adequately describes the "strategy
space" here. The strategy space in any game is comprised of the available strategies of each player
in the game. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 10 (1994). With respect
to choices and outcomes like those mentioned above, there are many more strategies that could at
least possibly dominate than simply cooperating or not cooperating. See id. at 19-46, 57-63
(describing limited cooperation, cooperation and defect, and ganging up in n-player games).
84. BD+C, supra note 52, at 28.
85. "The Brazilian Alcohol Program (PROALCOOL)-to produce ethanol from sugarcanewas established during the '70s, as a consequence of the oil crisis, aiming to reduce oil imports, as
well as to solve the problem of fluctuating sugar prices in the international market." Jose
Goldemberg et a!., How Adequate Policies Can Push Renewables, 32 ENERGY POL'y 1141, 1143
(2004). Today, PROALCOOL is a significant fuel source in Brazil, id., although its GHG reductions are unproven at best. See Renton Righelato & Dominick Spracklen, Carbon Mitigation by
Biofuels or by Saving and Restoring Forests?, 317 SCI. 902 (2007) (showing significantly higher
GHG emissions from the c1earcutting of forests needed for the production of biofuels than from
the protection and restoration of the forests themselves).
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and $38 billion by 201086 and some eighty-two percent of the builders surveyed recently said energy efficiency was what green home buyers sought
most. 87 LEED, of course, measures a building's energy conservation in tandem with its material and water conservation, indoor air quality, and its
location, and these factors may rival each other to some degree. Yet the
LEED standards, even as composites, represent a tremendous tool for communities and consumers seeking better energy and water efficiency. Like
building codes generally, LEED standards fill a need by gauging the states
of several distinct arts for those unable to do so themselves; they function as
a surrogate for individuated judgments. But such surrogates can offer tremendous advantages. Especially today as "greenwashing" is become a high
art and terms like "conservation development" are entering the language,88
tools such as this can be vital for buyers unsure how to verify the truth of
claims made by sellers.
They can be vital for communities as well, though. Overall, hazard
mitigation through land use planning is back on the agenda after Hurricane
Katrina and the many clues that more disasters of its kind are coming. 89
Energy purchases from wholesalers are usually for communities (if not
whole regions) and, in the future, demand management may well be the
difference between rolling blackouts and adequate supply.90 Even the optimistic climate models give a better than two-thirds chance of major water
supply catastrophes throughout much of the southwestern United States in
the second half of this century as a warmer climate evaporates more surface
water and melts greater amounts of snow pack more quickly.91 Significant
water conservation in many parts of the country is one reason that further
development is even still possible-and it seems that our changing climate
will make that true in more places in the not-too-distant future. 92 Indeed,
prolonged drought will probably be a reality for many sooner rather than
later. Thus, the same story of energy supply and a coming age of conflict
86. Anderson, supra note 59, at 10.
87. BD+C, supra note 52, at 28.
88. See Jeffrey C. Milder, A Framework for Understanding Conservation Development and
Its Ecological Implications, 57 BIOSCIENCE 757 (2007). So that I am not misunderstood, Milder's
work is aimed at serious "conservation and limited development projects." Id. at 757. But he
acknowledges that a major "concern is that developers will manipulate the conservation development label to attain advantages in project permitting and marketing in such a way that the concepts function as little more than a smoke screen for conventional sprawl." Id. at 766. Indeed, he
continues, "this concern has already been borne out in some projects." Id. Third party certification
is one means of controlling such green washing.
89. See, e.g., LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE (John R. Nolon & Daniel B. Rodriguez
eds., 2007).
90. See Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission
Siting Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REv. I (2005); Steven Ferrey, The Eagles of Deregulation: The
Role of the Courts in a Restructured Environment, 32 ENVTL. L. 297 (2002).
91. See Richard Seager et al., Model Projections of an Imminent Transition to a More Arid
Climate in Southwestern North America, 316 SCI. 1181 (2007).
92. See Jon Gertner, The Future is Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2007.
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may foretell much of what lies in store for water, as well. 93 Part IV situates
this story in our legal system's localism.
IV.

LAND USE PLANNING AND BUILDING CODES: LOCALISM's HOME

Except for islands of federal lands, there is no such thing as federal
land use planning. Indeed, until very recently, the regulation of development was almost exclusively a state and local matter. The 1992 Energy
Policy and Conservation Act mandated minimal energy conservation standards for major home appliances and, for example, a standard that
household toilets use no more than 1.6 gallons per flush. 94 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted any local or state land use law interfering
with the installation of satellite dishes on a home. 95 A few other provisions
of federal law have drilled down to regulate private land development directly.96 For the most part, though, federal law only indirectly regulates
private home building through the supply of public subsidies. 97 This relatively invisible federal influence has encouraged road-dependent-and,
thus, energy-dependent-growth by localities by hiding many of its costS.98
Indeed, our civic religion of "local control" over land use and, in particular,
over zoning, helps keep us blissfully ignorant of the fact that these federal
subsidies explain land use choices in the United States to a good extent.
Part IV briefly describes our land use law and how it has co-evolved with
suburbia into a world of self-regarding localities normally not disposed to
consider the "common good."

A.

From Building Cities to Building Suburbs

Building codes have long intersected various social and political debates, even as those debates themselves change course. Consider the role of
fire. It was the first threat to which American cities reacted with taut build93. See generally GLENNON, supra note 79.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 6295(k)(1)(A) (2004). The other major exception is the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-26 (2000), which
preempts local building codes as against manufactured housing. See, e.g., Scurlock v. City of
Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1998).
95. The Act also empowered parties aggrieved by localities denying the right to construct a
cellular tower. See 47 U.S.C. § 337 (2006); Nextel West Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282 F.3d 257 (3d
Cir. 2002); Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Comm. Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999).
96. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) is probably the
most prominent contemporary example. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000; Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism
and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized PerSOilS Act, 78 IND. LJ. 311 (2003).
97. Massive road building subsidies, whether through the Federal Highway Administration
or congressional earmarks, have played a starring role in our residential development patterns. See
William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 57 (1999).
98. The next logical step-that highways siphon people out of cities and are a principal cause
of our urban environments' livability deficits-is not much of a leap anymore. See Lewyn, supra
note 47, at 88-91.
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ing codes. 99 New York City, like others before and after it, endured "Great
Fires" in the 1830s and 1840s. By 1850, New York City had enacted
America's first comprehensive fire-safety building code. 100 Even then, it
was insurers who drove such proactive "public" measures,101 mostly by refusing to insure construction in places without minimum standards. (An insurer could force its insured to meet high standards, but when the
substandard adjacent building began the fire, the loss was the same.) A
century and a half later, urban fire has been brought to heel, due in good
part to building and construction standards. Today, suburban and exurban
fire is the real story-one that is growing graver every year. 102 With few
federal or state restrictions to speak of, haphazard rural development is unleashing more and more wildland sprawl into fire-prone areas that are then
perpetually at risk. 103 "Local control" and the rhetoric of private property,
coupled with federal subsidies, have allowed unprecedented levels of lowdensity sprawl that leaves individual localities to face these risks alone unless and until they can stitch together broader initiatives that do not just
induce leakage. 104
The supply of housing is another social and political debate that building codes regularly provoke shortages of low- and moderate-income housing are often attributed to building codes on the theory that they inflate the
costs of building habitable structures and, thus, dampen the supply of affordable housing. 105 The Town of Mount Laurel personified this debate
with its large square footage minimums for new homes.106 As such minimums rise, undoubtedly, the cost of individual homes rises. As a whole,
zoning and building regulations together have been attacked in the courts
with exactly this reasoning for decades. 107 Quantifying such theories,
though, is a real challenge. In fact, the wider and more sophisticated the
analyses become, the less simple accusations aimed at particular zoning
99. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 51-82 (1996).
100. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKIE L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 447 n.l (3d ed. 2005).
101. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA,
1870-1900 198-214 (1984).
102. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Fires' Cost to Insurers Is in Range of $1 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2007110/25Ius/25insure.html?ref=us#.
103. See Jamison E. Colburn, The Fire Next Time: Planning Land Uses in the WildlandUrban Inteiface, 31 J. LAND, REs. & ENVT. L. (forthcoming 2008).
104. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ApPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 63-67 (1985) (describing leakage that results when
restrictive zoning and building laws are adopted by only one jurisdiction in a metropolitan region).
105. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS: CONFRONTING THE REGULATORY MAZE (1978).
106. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 290 A.2d 465, 470-85 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), aff'd, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
107. See, e.g., Constr. Ind. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975); Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976); Twp. ofMt. Laurel, 336
A.2d at 713.
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and/or safety requirements actually hold up under scrutiny.108 Of course,
stringent design specifications can encourage longer-term use of substandard products already made and sold, raising the same paradoxes as other
grandfathering. 109 Some jurisdictions have moved to rehabilitation and total
"housing" codes as a result, but it remains unclear whether doing so actually levels the incentives. 110 Once again, the practical consequences of collective actions like land use controls are uncertain.
Perhaps this is why building codes today have become a synonym for
labyrinth. 111 Application and enforcement of codes is sometimes so complicated and stifling that legal challenges are justified. 112 Indeed, local codes
are inevitably a source of legal confusion because most are hybrid creatures
of state and local law. 113 The majority of states have building codes composited from distinct code elements governing: (1) all structural systems,
fire safety, general safety, and materials, (2) all plumbing, (3) the building's
combustion and mechanized equipment, (4) the electrical system, wiring,
and electrical devices, (5) energy consumption, and (6) accessibility for the
physically disabled. 1I4 As between the states and their localities, there are
four types of authority distributions: (I) state enacted codes that are exclusive and preempt local regulations entirely; (II) state enabling statutes allowing municipalities to enact their own building codes; (III) state enacted
codes that provide 'minimum standards' against which qualified localities
are permitted to add more stringent requirements; (IV) permutations of (II)
and (III) giving preference to particular codes sometimes with exceptions
for state buildings which are governed exclusively by state code or code
elements of varying stringency. This diversity of models has generated significant confusion over local authority. Whenever questions arise over a
particular local requirement in jurisdictions other than type I, builders usually argue that the provision is preempted on the theory that statewide uniformity is more economicYs Moreover, if a locality's authority grant is
108. See, e.g., Raymond J. Burby et aI., Building Code Enforcement Burdens and Central City
Decline, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 143 (2000); Richard F. Muth & Elliot Wetzler, The Effect of
Constraints on Housing Costs, 3 J. URB. ECON. 57 (1976).
109. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, What's Old Is New: The Problem With New Source Review, 29
REG. 36 (2006).
110. Lewyn, supra note 47. On the way total housing codes are twisted by enforcement discretion when implemented, see H. Laurence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement as Law in Action, 17
LAW & POL'y 133 (1995).
111. See Ross, supra note 110, at 135-36.
112. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. Gwinnett County, 272 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1967);
EJ. Bach v. County of St. Clair, 576 N.E.2d 1236 (III. Ct. App. 1991). Challenges too frequently
involve the corrupt application and enforcement of local building codes. See, e.g., Cruz v. Town
of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2001).
113. See David Listokin & David B. Hattis, Building Codes and Housing, 8 CITYSCAPE 21
(2005).
114. Id. at 23.
115. See, e.g., City of Morris v. Sax Invs., Inc., 730 N.W.2d 551 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
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ambiguous in any way, or its state's approach to building codes even hints
at preemption, many localities are predisposed to inaction. 116
Local control of land use is a widely shared expectation in America. It
is a norm that most judges and other officials try to respect most of the
time. But it is the exception to local legal authority generally, which is
dogged by pervasive judicial skepticism. ll7 Consider an example: Early Estates, Inc. v. City of ProvidenceY8 In that case, a Rhode Island statute authorized cities to adopt ordinances establishing "minimum standards for
dwellings" and defined this power grant to include "the conditions, maintenance, use and occupancy of dwellings . . . deemed necessary to make
[them] safe, sanitary, and fit for human habitation."119 Providence's ordinance required, among other things, proper lighting of common stairways
and hot water supplied to every "kitchen sink, lavatory basin, and bathtub
or shower."120 The court upheld the lighting requirement, but invalidated
the hot water requirement as insufficiently related to insuring "sanitary"
dwellings. 121 Textually, the distinction was rather baroque. The fact that a
property owner had no duty at common law to supply hot water to a tenant
is hardly a reason to find against the city's interpretation of its delegation. 122 Judicial skepticism of local governmental power, however, is commonplace in America. 123 Thus, even if (as the dissent in Early Estates
argued) the city reasonably concluded that hot water supply in 19.tchens and
baths was good for sanitation,124 a lack of express state authorization provokes questions about local authority routinely. 125 Outcomes like this may
even explain disparate levels of local engagement with issues of broad concern-issues that pervade suburbia and land use regulation generally.126

B.

The Ongoing Battle for Green Building's Standards

Besides this diversity-or perhaps because of it-the business of
building codes has been in flux for several years. What had been a market
of regional codes administered independently127 was, starting in 2000, consolidated into an "International Code Council" (ICC) that now administers a
unified system of "I-Codes."128 Most states have adopted the I-Codes. 129
116. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2255 (2003).
117. See Colburn, supra note 46, at 982-89.
118. 174 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1961).
119. [d. at 118.
120. [d. at 117-18.
121. [d. at 119 ("Can it be said that dwellings ... lacking [hot water facilities] are unfit for
human habitation?").
122. But see id. at 119.
123. See Barron, supra note 116, at 2260-78.
124. 174 A.2d at 120 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
125. Barron, supra note 116, at 2345-84.
126. [d. at 2347-52; Colburn, supra note 46, at 977-78.
127. Listokin and Hattis present the data. Listokin & Hattis, supra note 113, at 27-33.
128. Listokin & Hattis, supra note 113, at 29-31. "Because of the technical complexity of
these codes and the time and money needed to keep them updated, most state and local govem-
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The National Fire Protection Association code is the alternative fire code in
a small minority of states. l3O The I-Codes are becoming so dominant in the
market, in fact, that the ICC has emerged as a very large and powerful
"mediating structure" that indirectly governs the construction industry nationwide. It is far more influential over building standards than any state
government or governments combined. l31 When NAHB began to detect the
growing influence of LEED standards in new construction, it sprung to create its own green building program and to have it inserted into the 1Codes. 132 Will this preempt localities from adopting LEED?
Whether the I-Codes and their adoptions by particular states and municipalities are in any way inconsistent with some particular LEED standard
can be an extremely complicated question of fact. The engineering judgments at issue do no favors to transparency here.l33 USGBC maintains that
none of its standards will compromise the safety or integrity of a building,
but the information costs alone of cross-walking a LEED standard into a
real building code (especially building codes in states that follow model
(IV) above) could be prohibitive. Moreover, rent seeking in legislative
chambers is routinely clothed in public health and welfare appearances.
Those actors invested heavily in compliance with extant building codes will
certainly welcome incremental changes of those codes before they will topto-bottom overhauls. And the municipal adoption of LEED standards in lieu
of the current ICC energy code would be just such an overhaul. So will the
realpolitik of Washington lobbies like NAHB spell LEED's demise in this
battle to set the standard? Part V considers that question alongside the. quandary that green building puts each of us in amidst our fossil fuel economy.
V.

GREEN BUILDING AS LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATION

Comparing the risks and rewards of consumption and development at
the local level connects what would otherwise be hypothetical choices to
ments have abandoned the development and maintenance of their own codes, and rely on adoption
... of a model code." ld. at 23.
129. See International Code Council, About ICC: Introduction to the ICC, http://
www.iccsafe.org/news/aboutl (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
130. Listokin & Hattis, supra note 113, at 28-30.
131. Presently, the ICC reports that forty-seven states have adopted its International Building
Code, 45 states have adopted its International Residential Code, and forty-one states have adopted
its International Fire Code. See International Code Council, International Code Adoptions, http://
www.iccsafe.org/governmentladoption/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
132. See Lew Sichelman, NAHB, LEED Squaring Off to Establish a Green Standard, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 19,2007; cf Felicia Oliver, Vying To Be America's Green Home Building Standard,
HOUSINOZONE, June 19,2007 ("NAHB wanted to move quickly in giving ... builders and legislators a 'credible, cost-effective, nationally recognized program, with streamlined administration
and certification procedures' .... ").
133. Moreover, there are usually several different paths to LEED certification for any particular project and, thus, inconsistency with governing law in the strict sense should be rare. See
Christopher D. Montez & Darren Olsen, The LEED Green Building Rating System and Related
Legislation and Governmental Standards Concerning Sustainable Construction, 25 CONSTR. LAW.
38 (2005).
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people's lived experiences much more directly than if we were simply
bringing them up for a vote in Congress's budgetary bills or a logroll the
size of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 134 The comparison situates the tradeoffs at a human scale and makes it easier for citizen-consumers to gauge the
risks and benefits they are being asked to balance. More importantly, it
dampens the error costs of any particular decision: most sorts of mistakes
by local government are of lesser consequence than any corresponding mistake by the federal government. Any justification of subsidiarity along these
lines bears similarities to the libertarian attack on central government generally, championed in the twentieth century by Hayek and others. 135 But it
need not adopt that justification in full and, in fact, it is much better justified and explicated as a matter of practical reasoning in a large democratic
society. Part V makes that case.
Now surely most municipalities in America are authorized to take a
variety of steps that encourage the adoption of LEED standards within their
jurisdiction if they so chose. A municipality might, for example, provide
various tax incentives to builders willing to have their projects LEED certified. 136 It might hire a LEED certification specialist onto its payroll and
provide that service to residents and local builders free of charge. 137 It
might condition the supply of public support and infrastructure like water,
sewer, roads, and/or schools on the adoption of LEED standards development-by-development. 138 A municipality also might mandate that builders
disclose LEED building options and prices to prospective buyers on the
theory that such disclosures will generate their own demand. Additionally,
it might take steps to underwrite and subsidize life cycle analyses of all the
products and services delivered within its borders. 139 Each of these actions
is cooperative and permissive, not (necessarily) coercive.
Let us suppose, however, that a municipality wished to require that all,
most, or some of the new construction within its borders meet some speci134. On the layers of subsidy stuffed into the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
119 Stat. 594; see Eagle, supra note 90, at 32-46.
135. Of course, Hayek and his disciples do not stop at subsidiarity. Their epistemic attack on
governance ranges widely and covers most forms of public control of private preferences. See,
e.g., RANDy E. BARNETI', THE STRUCTURE OF LmERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998).
136. USGBC maintains an updated list of such jurisdictions on its website. See U.S. Green
Building Council, Summary of Government LEED Incentives, https://www.usgbc.org/
ShowFile.aspx?DocumentID=2021 (last visited Feb. 21, 2008).
137. This would drastically reduce the costs of certification. For homes, these costs are estimated to range between $500 and $2000 per certification. See USGBC supra note 64 and accompanying text.
138. The authority to trade public services or permissions to land owners on various conditions is widely presumed and is-unless expressly denied by local legislation or precedentimplied within the police power. See Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional
Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS LJ. 729 (2007).
139. LEED standards are but one species of life cycle analysis-a form of design based upon
the total impact of a product or service from its beginning to its "end." See generally WILLIAM
McDONOUGH & MICHAEL BRAUNGART, CRADLE TO CRADLE: REMAKING THE WAY WE MAKE
THINGS (2002).
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fied LEED rating level(s).14o This would transform a voluntary, marketbased performance measurement into a legal obligation. Of course, people
within individual municipalities would have to work cooperatively to enact
this legal obligation, perhaps for many months or years. And they would
have little assurance the law would survive the inevitable legal challenges 141 or that it would not just push its own "leakage." Still, some jurisdictions are contemplating this path. But does it, as a matter of GHG
emissions or water or material conservation, make sense to turn LEED into
a legal obligation? The answer to this question is more difficult and more
revealing than it may seem. Indeed, it is emblematic of our age and our
political discourse's wider collapse on the language of obligation where
complex public problems are concerned.
For neoclassical economics, the genius of local authority to legislate
legal obligations (if there is any) is the relative ease with which people can
opt out of unwanted legal obligations by moving. In theory, we can find the
mix of public services and restrictions on our autonomy that we prefer and
locate to that district which suits us best. 142 A diversity of public duties,
goods, and services provides a market of sorts and the comparatively lower
transaction costs at this scale make the "right of exit" more potent than a
similar right vis-a-vis larger jurisdictions. There is another reason for a diversity of such jurisdictions, though. An experimentalist interpretation of
our liberal constitutional order views anyone of these baskets of public
judgments as an exemplar comparable to other, similarly situated jurisdictions. It views the locality's interaction with its residents and environment
as information to be collected and integrated into whatever process/authority may be employed to synthesize collective action at broader scales. 143
Pooling such comparisons and making data on them widely available has
the potential to enhance both democratic and market freedoms.
Now it must be said that there are sharp legal conflicts on the horizon
for most any community that adopts LEED standards and almost certainly
for a community that adopts them as legally binding within its jurisdiction.
Lobbies like NAHB are working furiously to block exactly that move.
Those wishing to avoid or cancel a locality's legal rules have options besides leaving.144 Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the existence of
140. See, e.g., Patrick Hoge, S.F. Joins the Green Trend, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2007, at Al
("San Francisco is aiming to become one of the nation's first large cities to require that new,
privately developed buildings meet [LEED standards].").
141. See Oliver, supra note 132 and accompanying text.
142. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES (2001);
VINCENT OSTROM ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1988); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure TheO/y of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
143. See ROBERT WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1991); Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267
(1998).
144. So-called "home rule" grants to municipalities and counties usually contain a variety of
express and implicit limitations. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
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local legislative authority is virtually always contestable. 145 Our municipalities trace their legal origins to private corporate entities 146 and the judicial
scrutiny their legislative actions attract is usually swift and searching. Land
use may be the exception, but ought the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity play some role in deciding whether to mandate green building
standards?
Let us return to the original question: are these principles justified in
practical (secular) reason? The philosopher Joseph Raz has given the most.,
successful analysis of binding norms and practical reason.147 Raz argues
that a norm with the force of law functions as what he called an "exclusionary" reason-a reason for action whose function is to block practical reason
within its scope. Intuitively, when we confront reasons for action that conflict, we try to weigh them against each other. 148 One ought always take
whatever action one has any conclusive reason for taking on the balance of
reasons.149 Weare, though, better and worse at such judgments as individuals. Raz set legal rules up as exclusionary reasons, as a kind of second-order
reason, in exactly this connection. Rules are a means of confining the
weighing and comparing of first-order reasons. 150 However, Raz (like other
positivists) linked the force of law behind rules to their sources 151 and our
principles of solidarity and subsidiarity do not really have an authoritative
source for non-Catholics. They certainly are not law. So should they be
some other kind of second-order reason for action? In my view, the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity hold tremendous potential within the liberal constitutional tradition and the case study we have been sketching is as
good as any for demonstrating this potential. Section A situates these principles as elements of a philosophy of action in a world of unknown possibilities and consequences. Section B applies them to climate disruption
and land use decisions here at home.

105-37 (2d ed. 2001). Preemption is the other trump that has expanded in the hands of sophisticated counsel. See, e.g., Goodell v. Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1998); Voss v.
Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992). Indeed, even where home rule authority is
express, courts have implied limitations on local legislative authority when it invades certain common law precincts or certain "civil relationships." See Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule
and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1973).
145. See Colburn, supra note 46, at 986-91.
146. See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983); Joan C. Williams, The
Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 369
(1984).
147. See JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975).
148. Id. at 36.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979).
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An Epistemic Justification for the Principles of Solidarity and
Subsidiarity

An appreciable demand must exist before suppliers will invest in developing alternative energy and improved design of our built environments.
Those with the means to make such demands are in a qualitatively different
position from those who lack the means. 152 From the outset, we have allowed that there are two different kinds of these means: economic and political. Those of economic means can make their own demands for energy
efficient buildings while citizens can combine to make the demands collectively through a political process of some kind. But how are these kinds
really so different? If their differences consist in the types of action they
entail, then there are surely more than two relevant kinds. One's labor is as
important as her purchasing or voting choices. She should not just buy a
green home; she should go work for a green firm.153 Of course, doing that
may deprive her of the means to demand the green home she wants. Legislating obligations can be just as ineffective, though, given the possibility of
"leakage": people within a jurisdiction may change their behavior to comply with their (local) legal obligations. Those same people may also just
leave to avoid, or use the legal process to nullify, any unwanted obligations. 154 If it is the balance of human behavior that must change-and climate disruption seems to make GHG emissions just such a problem-then
legislating a (jurisdiction-specific) legal obligation into existence may end
up being pointless. 155 This is the need for a competent philosophy of action
in the real world: the inconsistencies and fallibilities of acts (collective and
individual) are situational, not categorical. For the actor trying to identify
152. "[T]ypical code compliant building makes minimal efforts to address energy and water
issues and totally ignores materials waste; impacts on the construction site and any other issue not
specifically covered in the building codes." Montez & Olsen, supra note 133, at 39.
153. Greening one's firm from within is another possibility. See generally DANIEL C. ESTY ET
AL., GREEN TO GOLD (2006) (detailing changes in philosophy at General Electric, Coca-Cola,
Timberland, and other firms aiming to profit from being more environmentally conscious). American Electric Power voluntarily committed to building a commercially viable integrated gasification combined cycle generating plant, capable of generating 1,000 megawatts with less emitted
CO2, mercury, sulfur and less wasted energy than any of the co-generation plants currently operating. Jeffrey Ball & Rebecca Smith, AEP Plans Biggest Power Plant Using Clean-Coal Technology, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2004, at A2. The "Carbon Disclosure Project" is a collaborative
venture that traces and seeks to reduce GRG emissions by monitoring and information pooling
among multinational corporations. See Carbon Disclosure Project, http://www.cdproject.net/
whatiscdp.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21, 123-25.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13. Using legislatures to inform and change
minds is a separate question. Local legislative processes exert real influence on local social norms
and that can be a good and sufficient reason for this type of action. There is, however, no reason to
disqualify locally created subsidies and/or other means of encouraging desired behavior (which do
not engender the hostility and/or jurisdictional leakage mandatory obligations often do) from this
educative dimension of legislative action. Indeed, the enactment of inducements may be more
likely to succeed as educative means than will the enactment of prohibitions as coercive means, all
things considered.
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inconsistencies or real trade-offs between possible actions, only practical
reasoning can do so.
Now it is easy to rationalize pointless actions by discounting the possibilities of action. 156 It is much more difficult to know what to do when
one sees real possibilities for one's agency. Yet lives are finite and people
choosing in earnest which paths and actions to take inevitably confront opportunity costs and informational dilemmas. Rational actions are those that,
on the balance of reasons, ought to be taken. Knowing the reasons for action, however, especially when we weigh the opportunity costs of our actions, and knowing how to balance correctly the reasons that conflict, can
be the severest of all challenges-whatever one's expertise. 1S7 What people
need above all is a strategy enabling them to act on the balance of reasons
while avoiding the costs of having to learn all of those reasons.158 This is
where the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity can do real work: by
guiding action without having to govern it.
Rarely can we know in advance what scale of action is necessary to
address problems like water and electricity supply or fossil fuel dependency
and climate dismption. Rarely can we know how long it will take to achieve
the right scales and to design the right solutions. Change requires individual
agents to probe the boundaries of such problems, to determine the scales at
which to propose and implement solutions in light of challenges like information costs and strategic action like "leakage." It is this interim to which
my interpretation of subsidiarity is aimed, the interval of time in which public problems are framed by those who perceive them. If collective action at
full scale cannot be taken without the achievement of improbable heights of
consensus-and climate dismption seems to be exactly this sort of problem l59-then it is perfectly reasonable to direct one's labor, capital, and
political voice toward the piecemeal actions that are possible today. 160 Section B unpacks this reasoning in the context of land use planning and greenhouse gas emissions.
156. A furious critique of American environmentalism motivated in good part by this premise
is made in NORDHAUS & SHELLENBERGER, supra note 5.
157. There are two components to this challenge, one of which is informational. See generally
Peter Morgan & Richard Manning, Optimal Search, 53 ECONOMETRICA 923 (1985); George 1.
Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 1. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). The other component is
analytical, though, and it implores us to collectivize our cognitive capacities by polyarchical
means. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 143, at 292-314.
158. Increasingly, such strategies must do without face-to-face social engagement as a means
of eliminating information costs. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000). On the
other hand, the costs of impersonal cooperation are falling. See YOCHAl BENKLER, THE WEALTH
OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 3-5 (2006).
159. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
160. As it turns out, most successful life cycle analyses to date have been place-based and
problem-oriented. See McDONOUGH & BRAUNGART, supra note 139, at 118-56. The use of "bioremediation" for water and sewage systems that operate locally, are based on local materials,
local energy and matter flows, and the local retention of nutrients, has proven revolutionary in
many ways. Id. at 125-27.
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A Justification for Piecemeal Actions Against the Biggest Public
Problems

If any public problem calls for broad scale collective action, climate
disruption and dependence on fossil fuels does. It is the achievement that
collective action broad enough to solve such problems represents which justifies subsidiarity, though.161 Such achievements are inherently provisional,
inherently contingent upon a myriad of preliminary, supporting steps. The
philosopher's objection that collective action always has more purchase
than personal action on such problems is precisely the kind of false imperative that we are right to reject. 162 Scaling our objectives is a process, often
long, contentious, and fused directly to our beliefs about substantive justice.
Furthermore, rarely will we know either our means or our ends in isolation
from each other. This is precisely what commends strategies limiting the
search for solutions to a perceived problem, at least initially, notwithstanding our intuitive need to cast our nets broadly.163 Rationality could hardly
require that the severest challenge-the challenge of information costs-be
attacked prematqrely. Approaches that can be justified both as a matter of
immediate and as a matter of uncertain future consequences seem to
achieve the uniquely rational balancing we seek. Of course, it is more rational still to subject all of one's beliefs to the continuing scrutiny of experience. 164 Thus, if one works to build a green home, the minor GHG savings
alone might not ultimately justify the effort. But this fact does not mean the
choice was wrong. It is reason to go further still.
Action always has scale. But scale is neither natural nor cultural; it is
perceptual. On fossil fuel dependency and water and energy waste, for example, a golden rule of using less and conserving more is obviously the
first-best-but just as obviously the most improbable-solution. 165 In
China and II).dia we are witnessing the most colossal urbanization of human
161. Professor Waldron has labeled this the dignity of legislation as action-in-concert. See
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 156-57 (1999) ("Action-in-concert is not easy,
particularly once people have a sense of themselves as individuals and of the ways in which acting
with others might conflict with smaller scale projects of their own. In fact, when it actually takes
place, action-in-concert is something of an achievement in human life.").
162. See supra text accompanying note 50. In other writings Goodin himself seems to recognize this, having argued that the pursuit of supposedly good ends through normal politics, especially when motivated by morality, has too often gone badly wrong. See ROBERT E. GOODIN,
MOTIVATING POLITICAL MORALITY (1992).
163. See Morgan & Manning, supra note 157, at 939.
164. NORTON, supra note 40, at 92 ("Adaptive managers emphasize experimentalism, taking
actions capable of reducing uncertainty in the future.").
165. Even assuming unanimity on the proposition that fossil fuel usage is destructive, "mutual
coercion, mutually agreed upon" could still be unattainable. Individually negligible harms can be
outweighed by their utility to the actors, like the smoker who (rationally) prefers the next cigarette
and quitting smoking. See Chrisoula Andreou, Environmental Damage and the Puzzle of the SelfTorturer, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 95 (2006).
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history .166 It is a process that promises to improve the quality of billions of
lives. Persuasion and influence being as imperfect as they are, though, there
seems little point in trying to stop it by championing peasantry as a way of
life. Somehow, we must help people on the other side of the Earth urbanize
without repeating our mistakes. 167 And we must communicate, not just negotiate, to do so.
In matching measures with the agents and jurisdiction(s) taking them,
subsidiarity offers to mediate between the types of actions worth taking and
the persons contemplating them. Subsidiarity in this sense is an epistemic
principle of agency-an ethic-that offers to economize on relevant information and to maximize the probabilities of right action. Climate disruption
and its relationship to fossil fuels is a good example. How should our voter/
consumer/laborer prioritize her work? Right now, it is impossible to know
how best to reduce GHG emissions in the world as it is. We confront obstacle upon obstacle-some of which are strewn across the planet-in seeking
to reduce GHG emissions in a way relevant to climate disruption. We cannot know, a priori, who will cooperate and when. 168 When it comes to using
less energy, we have no assurance that we will not just soften energy prices
and allow someone else to use more. If we just work for the creation of
collective caps on use, we must trust that others will share our optimism
and presume (with us) the efficacy of whatever scales our cooperative collective action reaches. 169 Yet there seems no real reason to do one or the
other. Indeed, if anything, spreading one's investments is probably the dominant strategy and selecting measures that will generate information if nothing else is the best way to do that. 170 This is subsidiarity and solidarity in
practice: the experimentalist recourse to more modest options first, the use
of persuasive over coercive means that treat others as potential partners not
166. Global rates of urbanization rose noticeably in the 1990s. The U.N. now projects that, by
2025, more than five billion people, or about seventy percent of humanity, will live in urbanized
areas. See William E. Rees, The Built Environment and the Ecosphere: A Global Perspective, 27
BUILDING REs. & INFo. 206, 210 (1999).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
168. "Strategic behavior arises when two or more individuals interact and each individual's
decision turns on what that individual expects the others to do." BAIRD ET AL., supra note 83, at 1.
Its prevalence is both a cause of and a challenge to governance of collective enterprises. See
generally KENNETH J. ARRow, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974).
169. This is risky because of the possibility of what are often called intransitive preferences.
"One's preferences are transitive if they satisfy the following condition: for all x, y, and z, if one
prefers x to y, and y to z, then one also prefers x to z." Andreou, supra note 165, at 102-03. But
with actions like air pollution, preferences do not necessarily satisfy this condition because "in
cases where damage results from the accumulation of individually negligible effects, it is tempting
to stick to a destructive course even when things have become very bad. For, even then, individual
indulgences remain negligible in terms of making things worse." [d. at 105.
170. Cf, NORTON, supra note 40, at 113 ("Pragmatism works because it simply encourages us
to develop methods that have always worked, to seek truth by pooling the community's experiences . . . . The strength of the community is precisely in its diversity of opinion and belief
systems.").
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competitors, and the collection of data from whole experiences revealing
optimal solutions or, barring that, suboptimal solutions acceptable to all. 171
Perhaps most importantly, such a strategy could also answer the philosopher Ronald Dworkin's worry mentioned at the outset l72 : the United States
has thus far lacked both consensus and a healthy culture of argument on
climate disruption. Scaling our climate disruption arguments down to manageably sized debates about land use, the plasticity of private preferences
and public subsidies, or even the nurturing of social values at the community level, creates a vastly more numerous sample size of jurisdictions taking action, and thus a higher probability of discovery and of real
deliberation. It makes less sense, in short, to seek the enactment of stringent
legal rules at present because for rules to address this problem effectively,
they have to be of immense scale and, thus, their negotiaton entails immense costs-at least for the time being.173 The opportunity costs of negotiating coercive duties in matters so complex too often outweigh their
possible utility. Many cities and towns across America are engaged in the
directly deliberative work that they are-reinventing transport, development, and land use-for exactly this reason.174 They have witnessed the
inaction of broader scales and acted, albeit through innately insufficient
means. Solidarity and subsidiarity in this way illustrate how liberalism's
public/private divide is actually lived today: hardly at all. Where does one's
agency as citizen stop and that as consumer or laborer begin? Should one
build a LEED home or work to enable neighbors to use LEED standards in
building their home? As a matter of means/ends rationality, neither plan is
necessarily better by itself and only some distinct principle of priority can
arbitrate which comes first. I have argued that information costs and the
plurality of our citizenship give us an independent reason to prefer modest
action. But, acts of solidarity (helping to reduce ORO emissions in places
like China and India) can make any plan better still.
Solidarity and subsidiarity just as surely reject the work of lobbies like
NARB who seek to preempt experimentalism wholesale. 175 Centralized ac171. See id. at 105-13. Whatever the level of government, there is no shortage of experience
where legislated legal obligations to conserve have provoked as much or more conflict as they
have conservation. See Jamison E. Colburn, Habitat and Humanity: Public Lands Law in the Age
of Ecology, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 145 (2007). Smaller mistakes are more corrigible, though, and, if
made in parallel, more readily avoided by the pooling of experiences. Finally, at a very practical
level, the pervasive judicial skepticism of local legal authority like that displayed in Early Estates,
174 A.2d at 117, see supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text, blunts the point of turning
market-shaping performance standards like LEED into legal obligations.
172. See DWORKIN, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
173. Cf BOHMAN, supra note 6, at 237 ("Deliberative democracy places great demands on
both ordinary citizens and political institutions. For this reason, many of its critics have argued
that deliberative democracy is an unworkable ideal under any circumstances, indeed one that
accentuates all the typically mentioned weaknesses of democracy.").
174. See generally Nolon & Bacher, supra note 79.
175. See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
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tors are assuredly every bit as duty bound to support experimentation and
the dissemination of its results under our circumstances as they are to
forego preempting it. I76 Jt is in this sense that acting locally is how to fulfill
one's obligations to do and to seek justice while real dilemmas of scale are
resolved empirically. That kind of pragmatism in the face of practical challenges is probably uniquely American.
[I]f by the bettering of social relations we mean the realization of
liberal values, especially effective freedom to participate in and
contribute to social action, then Dewey was prepared to concede
that true participatory democracy could not be established until
the social and human sciences had evolved into practical sciences
whose research into the material of human nature could be fruitfully applied to the education and training of an intelligent, cooperative community.I77
The human sciences, that is, must be the ingredients of democratic
action before any applied ethics have much chance of enabling us to do the
right thing.
My point has not been to deny the necessity of long-term planning or
broad scale action. But the "temporal order," as Catholicism calls it, is finite
by nature and doing nothing but trying to eliminate uncertainty or build
consensus is too often indistinguishable from procrastination. In short, planning out our actions in concert with others is best segmented and carried out
opportunistically precisely because of our institutional, legal, and moral
diversities. I78
Mahatma Gandhi taught that we should be the change we wish to see
in the world. But Ghandi understood better than most the complications of
changing behaviors.
Gandhi ... was approached one day by a woman who was deeply
concerned that her son ate too much sugar. "I am worried about
his health," she said. "He respects you very much. Would you be
willing to tell him about its harmful effects and suggest he stop
eating it?" After reflecting on the request, Gandhi told the woman
that he would do as she requested, but asked that she bring her
son back in two weeks, no sooner. In two weeks, when the boy
and his mother returned, Gandhi spoke with him and suggested
176. Cf, WELCHMAN, supra note 42, at 186-99 (revealing the affinities for justice within
Dewey's ethical thought and showing that Dewey expected expertise and leadership to shape
community development). Professor Buzbee has made the most thorough case against broad preemption regarding risk regulation, including that of GHGs. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Debate, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1616-19
(2007). The one sure role for super-ordinate action is divulging whatever unfair advantages subsidiary actors may be deriving from self-regarding, solidarity-diminishing behaviors. Those who
prosper at the expense of the common good are certainly due less from others.
177. WELCHMAN, supra note 42, at 207.
178. See Daniel C. Esty. Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv.
115, 146-48 (2004).
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that he stop eating sugar. When the boy complied with Gandhi's
suggestion, his mother thanked Gandhi extravagantly-but asked
him why he had insisted on the two-week interval. "Because," he
replied, "I needed the two weeks to stop eating sugar myself."179
The scales at which we take our actions against GHGs need not limit
the horizons of our moral, political, and economic agency, though. Acting
locally does not entail lococentrism, especially with a problem like climate
disruption. Rapid urbanization in India and China is generating environmental costs of unprecedented proportions while it creates the next generation of energy-hungry communities. As cities and towns here tackle the
problems of urbanization while at the same time reducing land, energy,
water, and material waste, they are experimenting as communities. Who is
collecting and sharing their experiences? To be sure, the steps they take
toward conservation will necessarily allow any top-down measures ultimately proposed to address behavioral changes of smaller magnitudes. But
it is the wide sharing of their learning, especially abroad, that could be truly
transformative. 180 Which legal innovations actually induce economic activity to leak out to other jurisdictions?181 Which design enhancements actually induce longer-term use of substandard products?182 How are
preferences born of wealth-which were once viewed as "needs"-transformed into "wants" and, ultimately, into the trivial proclivities that evaporate under pressure?183 Will an "alternative" combustion source actually
reduce carbon emissions?184 These are the epistemic opportunities of subsidiarity and solidarity: one leverages the other into a whole greater than
their sum as parts. People who take small steps toward the good are rarely
precluded from scaling their successes up and out. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that communicating lessons learned on small scales to aid those
facing our same quandaries is ethical conduct in every possible world. We
have no time to waste, though. All mistakes are eventually irreversible.

179. AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 14 (1992).
180. Cf GOODIN, supra note 162, at 153 ("In a world characterized by widespread tit-for-tat
retaliation-in an arms race or a trade war or an extensive electorate, for example-you do unto
others as you would have them do unto you, precisely because they will do unto you as you have
done unto them."). The costs and barriers to this kind of sharing are dropping rapidly. See generally BENKLER, supra note 158.
181. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

